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Abstract:  Tradeoffs between monetary wealth and fatal safety risks are 
summarized in the value of a statistical life (VSL), a measure that is widely 
used for the evaluation of public policies in medicine, the environment, and 
transportation safety.  This paper demonstrates the widespread use of this 
concept and summarizes the major issues, both theoretical and empirical, 
that must be confronted in order to provide a credible estimate of a VSL.  
The paper concludes with an application of these issues to a particular study 
of speed limits and highway safety. 
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Robber:  “This is a stick-up.  Your money or your life.” 
(pause) 
Robber:  “Look, bud.  I said your money or your life.” 
Jack Benny:  “I’m thinking it over.” 
The Jack Benny Radio Program, March 8, 1948 
 
 
  Public choices about safety in a democratic society require estimates 
of the willingness of people to trade off wealth for a reduction in the 
probability of death.  Estimates of these trade-offs are used in evaluating 
environmental issues, public safety in travel, medical interventions and in 
many other areas.  It has become common to call this trade-off the value of a 
statistical life (VSL).  The purpose of this paper is to provide a summary 
discussion of the major problems encountered in measuring the value of a 
statistical life.  These problems are both theoretical issues of interpretation, 
and difficult problems of measurement.
1
  A key issue to clarify at the outset is the precise meaning of the phrase 
“the value of a statistical life,” which many no doubt find distasteful.  
Indeed, how can the value of your own life even be calculated?  The answer, 
of course, is that unlike the notorious skinflint comedian Jack Benny, we 
would give up all our wealth to avoid the certain loss of our own life, so 
there is no upper bound on this definition of the value of life.  Yet, at the 
                                                 
1 Thaler and Rosen (1976) provide the first careful discussion of this topic.  They are responsible for much 
of the terminology used and for some of the earliest measurement. same time, everyone takes risks, some of which could be avoided by the 
expense of either time or money.  When we expend wealth to avoid 
potentially fatal risks, or accept wealth to take such risks, we are implicitly 
defining a trade-off between wealth and the probability of death, whether we 
like it or not.  The ratio of the wealth we are willing to accept in exchange 
for a small change in the probability of a fatality is expressed in units of 
“dollars per death,” or the dollar value of a fatality. It is for this reason that 
this trade-off is often called the value of a “statistical” life, the word 
“statistical” is intended to make it clear that this is, despite its colloquial 
familiarity, a technical term.   
 
1.  What is the VSL? 
  To make matters concrete, suppose that an economic agent is willing 
to accept the consequences of an action that involves an increase of at least 
ΔW in wealth in return for an increase in the probability of a fatality of ΔP.  
Then V*= ΔW/ ΔP is an acceptable trade-off to that agent, and it is the VSL 
for the tradeoff described by this particular fatality risk.  V* need not be a 
constant, of course, and would certainly be expected to depend on the level 
of P at which it is evaluated, a person’s wealth, and perhaps many other 
factors, including personal preferences.   How is V* to be measured?  It is apparent that V* is not directly 
observable, so an indirect method is required for measurement.  One 
possibility is simply to ask the agent.  Though this procedure has its 
advocates, and certainly has been used in practice, for many it suffers from 
its purely hypothetical nature.  That is, would the same answer be revealed if 
a “real” decision corresponding to the hypothetical question were taken?  
The primary advantage of simply asking is, of course, the ease with which it 
can be done, especially in situations where it is difficult to observe real 
choices, and this is no doubt a key reason for its popularity.   
  An alternative approach is based on an agent’s revealed preference.  
Suppose we consider an offer V to accept an action with known wealth and 
fatality risk.  In this case V is known because it is possible to calculate the 
numerator and denominator that comprise it.  If the agent accepts the risk, 
then we know that V>V*.  That is, the wealth received was worth more than 
the fatality risk incurred.  Thus, the observable V provides an upper bound 
on V*, but it is not possible to say more without further assumptions. 
  To do this, assume that V* is determined by some variables X, which 
are observable, and some that are unobservable, ε, so that for the ith unit  
(1) Vi* =α’ + β’Xi + εi’. 
  Likewise, assume that V is determined by other factors Z, so that  (2)  Vi = α + βZi + εi. 
Since the risk will be accepted if Vi > Vi*, the probability that the higher risk 
is accepted is thus: 
(3)    Pr (Acceptance)  = Pr (Vi > Vi*)     
     =   P r   ( εi - εi’ < α - α’ + βZi - β’Xi). 
  It is apparent that the average value of V among those who accept the 
risk, E(V|Accept) = E(V|V>V*), must be at least as great as E(V*), the 
unconditional average value of a statistical life among both those who accept 
and those who do not accept the risk.  Since the left hand side of equation (2) 
is only observed for those who accept the risk, estimation of the parameters 
of equation (2) may suffer from selection bias. 
  To make further progress further assumptions are required.  Assume, 
for example, that εi and εi’ are joint normally distributed, so that (3) can be 
estimated by the probit function: 
 (4)     Pr  (Adoption)  =  F[(α - α’ + βZi - β’Xi)/σ], 
where σ = σε - ε’ is (var (ε - ε’))
1/2 and F[•] is the cumulative unit normal 
distribution.  It is apparent that even with this functional form assumption, it 
is only possible to obtain estimates of (α - α’)/ σ, β/σ, β’/σ.  The separate 
parameters in equations (1) and (2) cannot be identified from this probit 
function alone.  However,  since  Vi is observable, it is possible to estimate (2) by the 
usual selection corrected regression methods (Heckman 1979).  In particular, 
 (5)   E(Vi|acceptance) = α + βZi + ρσελi, 
where ρ is the correlation between ε and ε’, λi = λ(Xi, Zi) = f(μ’Wi)/F(μ’Wi), 
and μ’ consists of the vector [α - α’, β, -β’]’ and Wi the vector [1, Xi, Zi].  
This model is exactly identified, so that it is possible, in principle, to 
determine the parameters of equation (1) and thus to calculate the average 
value of the VSL in the population or for groups that have different values of 
X.
2    
  The implementation of this model places very considerable demands 
on the data typically available.  In reality, the vast majority of studies settle 
for providing estimates of V among those people who accept risks.  Since 
this is the best information that is often available, it is inevitable that we 
must rely on these estimates for public decisions.  However, it is important 
to consider the limitations of this approach, just as it is important to consider 
the strengths. 
 
2.  How are estimates of the VSL used? 
  a. Traffic safety decisions 
                                                 
2 See Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) for the details.   Some of the earliest use of VSL estimates, and an area that remains of 
great practical importance, is in the design of highways.
3  Though 
simplified, a large number of government highway departments throughout 
the world engage in an analysis of two key questions virtually daily:  (1) 
Within a given budget, what is the best way to allocate resources so as to 
reduce traffic fatalities?  (2)  Is the budget sufficient to lower fatalities to the 
point where the typical driver would not be willing to pay more for traffic 
safety.   
  The first question does not require a measure of the VSL, but it does 
make use of the key ingredients that make up that analysis.  Suppose, for 
example, there are 3 places on three different city streets where safety 
improvement projects could be undertaken.  And suppose that in these 
projects the cost of saving a life is 3.0 million, 1.0 million, and .5 million 
dollars, respectively.  Clearly, allocating funds to the third project is wiser 
than allocating funds to the other projects, as you get more for your “safety 
buck.”  For half a million dollars you can save a life, while with the first 
project you must spend 6 times as much to do so.  In short, minimizing 
fatalities within a given budget requires calculation of the cost per fatality 
saved, which is much like the calculation of V in the discussion above. 
                                                 
3 de Blaeij, Arianne, Raymond J.G.M. Florax, Piet Rietveld, and Erik Verhoef (2000) provide a detailed 
survey of estimates of the VSL derived from traffic safety data and decisions.   However, suppose that the total budget for safety projects in this city 
is 1.5 million dollars.  Clearly, this means that only the second and third 
projects will be undertaken.  But is this optimal?  The answer to this 
question depends on the VSL. If the VSL is more than 3 million dollars, then 
clearly the third project should be undertaken also, because the typical 
person is willing to give up more than 3 million dollars to save a life.  Thus, 
the VSL plays a key determinant in discussions of how big the traffic safety 
budget should be. 
  There does not seem to be a careful report of actual values used by 
highway departments for the VSL, but even a little brief study will reveal 
that this approach to highway safety is astonishingly widely used.  For 
example, the state of California’s department of transportation, Caltrans, 
uses $3,104,738 as the VSL,  and reports that the US Department of 
Transportation used a VSL value of $3 million as of January 2004.
4   
Although estimates of the VSL in the literature range quite widely, from say 
$1 million to $8 million, it is my impression that highway departments often 
use estimates at the bottom end of this range and sometimes below it.  If the 
VSL is higher than the one being used by the appropriate agency, of course, 
                                                 
4 See http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/tpp/offices/ote/Benefit_Cost/benefits/accidents/value_estimates.html.  This 
web site also provides a tutorial on just how to use the VSL to calculate the value of a highway safety 
improvement. the implication is that too many fatal accidents are taking place and that the 
level of highway safety is sub-optimal. 
  b. Benefit-cost analysis of environmental regulations 
  The Environmental Protection Agency routinely makes use of the 
VSL concept in the evaluation of the costs of environmental health and 
safety risks.
5  The basic idea is to estimate fatality risks associated with a 
particular environmental hazard and compel abatement to the point where 
the cost of an additional life saved is greater than the VSL.  This is, of 
course, the same use of the VSL as in the analysis of traffic safety, although 
it is couched in different terms and often leads some observers (not 
economists!) to rather different conclusions about the merits of the approach. 
  Of course, any decision by a government agency regarding safety has 
implications for the VSL implied by that agency’s actions.  Viscusi (2000) 
provides an example of a number of implied estimates of the VSL from 
various US government agency decisions.  An interesting feature of these 
estimates is that many of them lie far above the range of $1 to 8 million 
found in the literature.  This implies, of course, that some environmental 
rules have been adopted that may be more stringent that would be optimal.. 
 c.  Medical  interventions and technology 
                                                 
5 See Blomquist (2004) for a thoughtful review and summary of the VSL concept that was prepared at the 
request of the Environmental Protection Agency.   The use of the VSL in medicine is much the same as in the areas 
discussed above, though measures of the value of a life saved take on their 
own special dimensions.
6  In effect, the adoption of a medical procedure is 
justified if its cost is low enough compared to the life years it saves.  
  It is not difficult to convert a VSL to the value of a life year saved 
(LY).  If the VSL is based on the life of someone who is 40 years old, and if 
mortality absent the intervention is 80, then a life saved corresponds to 
roughly 40 life years.  In this example, if the VSL is $4 million, then a VLY 
is $100 thousand.  If an intervention saves a life year and costs less than 
$100 thousand, it would be considered cost effective using this standard. 
  The value of a life year takes on special significance in medicine 
because a life may be saved, but the person whose life is saved may have far 
less than a normal, or even acceptable, quality of life.  This leads to attempts 
to estimate ‘quality adjusted life years” (QALY).  Needless to say, providing 
universally acceptable measures of the quality of life can generate 
considerable controversy. 
  An unusual feature of estimates of the value of QALY is the widely 
cited importance of a rough cut-off of $50 thousand.  This estimate comes 
from the national discussion of, and agreement to provide federal funds for, 
                                                 
6 The literature and discussion of this topic is enormous,  and ranges from handbooks for practitioners to 
discussions of ethical issues related to the use of VSL measurements. kidney dialysis treatments on a universal basis in 1972 with the End-Stage 
Renal Disease Amendment to the Medicare program, which extended 
coverage to patients under the age of 65.
7  Kidney dialysis costs roughly $50 
thousand per year and its provision is essential to provide a year of 
additional life to a patient with kidney failure.  Since kidney dialysis is 
clearly a treatment that has been revealed  preferred, it provides a lower 
bound on the value of a life year.  It also provides, by extension, a lower 
bound on the VSL when it is properly adjusted.  It is important to note that 
this method for bounding the VSL is really an application of the procedure 
set out formally above, though it is my impression that the medical 
profession discovered this method “independently” because its use is so 
natural. 
 
3.  Problems in the measurement of a VSL 
  There are both conceptual issues to confront in the interpretation of 
estimates of a VSL as well as potentially difficult measurement issues. 
  a. Endogeneity of risks 
  Perhaps the most important issue concerning the design of a study of 
the VSL relates to the role of the conceptual experiment that the investigator 
                                                 
7 See Weinstein (2005) for a very readable discussion of this and related issues in the cost-effective practice 
of medicine. is designing.  Is there an exogenous event that will affect wealth and fatality 
risk to which we can observe an agents response?  If there is, then it is 
possible to measure the effect of the event on (a) wealth, and (b) fatality risk.  
The ratio of these two effects, given that the event was accepted then 
provides an estimate of V just as defined above and thus it provides a bound 
on the VSL.   
  However, such events are very difficult to isolate in practice.   
Consider, for example, a driver’s choice of a speed.  The reciprocal of the 
driver’s speed is the hours it takes to travel a mile.  Higher speeds reduce 
travel time, which is a form of travel cost, and reducing travel time is 
something that, other things the same, drivers prefer.  At the same time, 
higher speeds will, given the condition and congestion of a road, lead to a 
higher risk of fatality.  This suggests that we might consider the relation of 
speed to fatalities across roads as a measure of the causal effect of speed (or 
the time it saves by faster driving) on fatalities. 
  It is not hard to see that the relation, across roads, between speed and 
fatalities is not a causal one.  Instead, both fatalities and speeds are, in part, 
determined by a third factor, typical road condition and congestion level.  
When a road is safe, drivers will sensibly increase their speeds.  Thus the 
observed relation between speed and fatalities across roads reflects two offsetting forces:  one is that increased speed causes more fatalities, and the 
other is that higher speeds result from lower fatality risks.  Whether the net 
effect is a positive or negative relation between speed and fatalities is 
unclear, but one thing is clear:  absent some further assumptions, the 
resulting relationship does not reveal anything about the risk trade-off posed 
by higher speeds and thus does not provide a way to bound the VSL.
8
  A common approach to measuring the VSL uses the relation between 
wages and fatality risks on jobs.  However, it is rarely possible to compare 
identical jobs that face different fatality risks, and the result is similar to the 
endogeneity problem described above with respect to highway safety risks.  
The net relation between wages and fatality risks contains both the causal 
effect due to the higher wage demanded for higher fatality risks and the 
result of the effect of other factors (skill, working conditions, etc.) that effect 
pay and are correlated with fatality risks across job types.  Whether the net 
effect results in a positive or negative relation between pay and fatality risk 
is unclear.
9
  b. Whose life is it, anyway? 
                                                 
8 In fact, empirically the net relation between speed and fatalities near zero.  See Ashenfelter and 
Greenstone (2004). 
9 See especially Black and Kniesner (2003).  In more than half of their specifications, they find that for 
male (and female) workers fatality risks are estimated as negatively related to wage rates, implying VSL 
estimates that are also negative.  Also see Hersch (1998) who finds a negative association between injury 
rates and wages for all male workers.  Many other studies find a positive relation between wage rates and 
fatality risks, including the earliest such estimate by Thaler and Rosen (1976).   It would be surprising if VSL did not vary across people with different 
preferences, across income levels, and even over the life cycle.  A natural 
question to ask, therefore, of any VSL estimate is, just whose preferences are 
being measured?  There is, of course, a further question.  Just whose 
preferences do we want to measure? 
  In general the latter question is no doubt easier to answer than the 
first.  When public decisions are being made we normally would like to base 
decisions on (and in a democratic society will base them on) the preferences 
of the central agent, that is, neither the agent who loves risk the most nor the 
agent who hates risk the most, but someone in the center of the distribution 
of preferences.  However, many useful studies of the VSL are naturally 
based on risk acceptance behavior that is not in the center of the distribution, 
and in other cases it is unclear whose preferences are being elicited. 
  For example, inexpensive, effective safety devices will be adopted by 
virtually everyone, while expensive, ineffective safety devices will be 
adopted by few.  As a result, the decision to adopt either of these two 
extreme types of devices provides very weak bounds on the VSL of, say, the 
median agent.   
  An extreme example of this issue can arise in studies of the labor 
market.  Suppose that there are two jobs, one riskier than the other, and that the former comprises the proportion θ of all jobs.  Suppose also that there 
are two types of workers, one that demands a higher premium for risky jobs 
than the other, and the former comprises λ of the workers.  Clearly, workers 
will be sorted into jobs so as to minimize employer wage costs.  If λ< θ, then 
the risky jobs can be filled with workers who demand the low premium, 
while the reverse is the case if λ> θ.  Thus, the observed premium for risk 
depends critically on the sorting of workers and the distribution of 
preferences as well as of risks.  In the first case, if λ < .5 the observed 
premium for risk will be less than the premium that would be demanded if 
all workers were confronted with a risk.  The reverse may, of course, also be 
the case. 
  In principle, this discussion suggests that VSL’s measured from 
political decisions that represent the center of the distribution of preferences 
are the most appropriate for use in public policy decision making.  However, 
these decisions may suffer from other problems either because they do not, 
in fact, represent the median preference or because the agents whose 
opinions are revealed are poorly informed. 
  c. Do they know the risks? 
  A further problem is associated with the ability of agents to make 
informed decisions in situations where safety risks are difficult for even experts to quantify.  In road safety most people have some appreciation or 
feeling for the risks involved, though it is far from clear that extreme risks 
are well understood.  However, in medicine virtually everyone relies on the 
services of an expert or doctor to assist in assessing risks.  Likewise, many 
environmental risks are difficult for even an expert to quantify. 
  In principle, the preferences revealed in the measurement of a VSL 
are not based on misperceptions, but are accurate.  However, even if they are 
not, it can be argued that the trade-off between wealth and incorrect 
assessments of risk do reveal the VSL so long as it is know what 
assessments the agents relied upon in their decisions.  Of course, eliciting 
the latter may be very difficult.
10
 d.  Agency  problems 
  It is often the goal to use a measure of a VSL in a public policy setting 
where it is useful to avoid taking the issue for decision to the public directly 
because doing so is excessively costly relative to the value of the decision.  
Decisions such as the assignment of road repair priorities are obviously more 
sensibly left to the highway department, for example, than to a public vote. 
Since the VSL will be externally provided in the making of these decisions, 
it is apparent that high standards are required for its measurement. 
                                                 
10 A review of the literature on this issue is contained in Blomquist (2004)   Thus, measures of the VSL based on what may only appear to be the 
public’s preferences must be distinguished from measures that really are 
based on those preferences.  An especially difficult problem arises when the 
benefits from a risk reduction are paid for by a group different from those 
whose risks are reduced.  Depending on the political power of the two 
groups, the observed decision may differ considerably from a reasonable 
estimate of the VSL.  Viscusi (2000) provides many examples that might be 
interpreted from this perspective in the area of environmental regulation.  
The evidence suggests that in these cases the benefits of environmental 
regulations have been given greater weight than would be consistent with 
most VSL measures.  This suggests that environmental groups may have 
played an important role in the regulatory process independent of what 
would be implied by the concern for fatality risks, though this is a 
controversial issue and there are other explanations for these findings. 
 
4.  An example of VSL measurement:  speed limits 
  Although there have been a number of creative attempts designed to 
estimate the value of a statistical life, there have been few opportunities to 
obtain estimates based on the public’s willingness to accept an exogenous 
and known safety risk.  An analysis that does fall into this category is a study of highway safety risk decisions that resulted from the opportunity that 
the federal government gave the states in 1987 to choose a speed limit for 
rural interstate highways that was higher than the uniform national 
maximum speed limit then in existence.
11  This remarkable natural 
experiment led 40 of the 47 states that have rural interstate highways to 
adopt 65 mile per hour (mph) speed limits on them, while the remaining 7 
states retained 55 mph speed limits.  The basic idea is to measure the value 
of the time saved per incremental fatality created by the voluntary adoption 
of an increased speed limit.  Since adopters must have valued the time saved 
by greater speeds more than the fatalities created, this ratio provides a 
convincing and credible upper bound on the value of a statistical life (VSL). 
  Though far from perfect, this institutional change does make it 
possible to address several conceptual problems noted above that have 
plagued attempts to estimate the value of a statistical life.  First, the 1987 
law provides a credible exogenous change in the safety environment.  As a 
result it is possible to measure the effects of this exogenous change on 
speeds and fatality rates.  The ratio of these two effects provides an estimate 
of V, the trade-off the parties faced in making their decision.   Second, many 
questions have been raised about the usefulness of studies of the value of a 
                                                 
11 This example is based on Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004). statistical life when the decision makers studied may be poorly informed 
about the relevant risks.  In this case the relevant decision makers (i.e., state 
governments) were cognizant of the trade-offs associated with a change in 
speed limits.  Although this does not provide conclusive evidence that the 
participants in the decisions were well informed, it is certainly more 
plausible than is often the case.  Third, any VSL estimate that is based on the 
decisions of a third party (e.g., government policies) may not reflect the 
preferences of the group whose VSL is of interest.  Speed limit regulations, 
however, provide benefits (reduced travel time) and costs (fatality risk) to 
precisely the same people, so that appeals to a simple model of the typical 
voter are far more plausible in this context.  Finally, it seems perfectly 
reasonable to think that the voter whose preferences the state governments 
represented are those of someone whose preferences are toward the center of 
the distribution of preferences toward risk. 
  a. The history of speed limits in the US 
    The first laws imposing restrictive speed limits on motor vehicles 
were passed in 1901 in Connecticut.  It is not surprising that speed limits 
have been enacted in places like Connecticut where congestion results in 
external effects on other drivers from any driver’s speed.  Indeed, the 
purpose of speed limits is to reduce the variability in speeds that results in unacceptable fatality risks.
12  Except for a brief period during the Second 
World War, the setting of speed limits remained the responsibility of the 
state and local governments until 1974.  In that year Congress enacted the 
Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act in response to the perceived 
“energy crisis.”  This bill, intended as a fuel conservation measure, required, 
among other things, a national maximum speed limit of 55 mph.  This new 
national speed limit was lower than the existing maximum daytime speed 
limit in all 50 states. 
By 1976 the Federal Highway Administration began to enforce 
compliance with the national speed limit.  Each state was required to 
measure compliance with the federal limit.  States that did not enforce 50% 
compliance with the limit were penalized by a 10 % reduction in federal 
highway funding.  By 1987 dissatisfaction with the federally imposed (and 
enforced) national maximum speed limit led Congress to modify the law to 
permit states to set speed limits of 65 mph on rural interstate highways only. 
                                                 
12 Indeed, an Indiana Department of Transportation reports states this explicitly: 
“Speed limits represent trade-offs between risk and travel time for a road class 
or specific highway section reflecting an appropriate balance between the 
societal goals of safety and mobility.  The process of setting speed limits is not 
merely a technical exercise.  It involves value judgments and trade-offs that are 
in the arena of the political process”   See Khan, Sinha, and McCarthy, 2000, p. 
144. 
 Even with the end of the concern for fuel conservation, the national 
maximum speed limit was retained in some form until repeal in 1995.
13  
Despite opposition, especially in the wide open Western states, much of the 
support for national speed limits may have resulted from the unintended 
impact that this law appeared to have on motor vehicle fatalities.  Figure 1 
shows the history of fatalities per 100 million vehicle mile of travel (VMT) 
from 1966-93.  It is apparent that fatalities per mile traveled had been 
declining during this entire period, but the decline of 15 percent (nearly 
10,000 fatalities) immediately following passage of the 1974 Emergency 
Highway Energy Conservation Act is the largest ever recorded in a single 
year and was widely remarked upon at the time. 
  b. Did speeds and fatality rates change? 
  Some very simple analyses of the impact of adopting the 65 mph 
speed limit on rural interstates are reported in the top panel of Table 1.  The 
basic idea is to assume that, absent the adoption of the new speed limit, the 
change in speeds for non-adopters on rural interstates would equal what it 
would have been for the adopters had they not adopted the new speed limit.  
Thus the difference in these differences provides a simple estimate of a 
                                                 
13 By the end of 1997 only three states maintained a 55 mph speed limit on rural interstates: 20 
states had rural interstate speed limits of 65 mph, 16 were at 70 mph, 10 at 75 mph, and Montana had no 
daytime speed limit, returning to its policy in 1973.    
 “treatment” effect due to the speed limit.  It is important to determine 
whether actual speeds increased as absent such an increase there is no actual 
natural experiment taking place.  Thus, it is important to measure the effect 
of the treatment on both actual speeds and on fatalities. 
  Column (1) reports the raw unadjusted difference in differences (DD) 
estimator of the effect of the 65 mph speed limit on fatality rates and speeds.  
This is calculated as the difference between the mean fatality rates and 
speeds between adopters and non-adopters from 1988-93 (i.e., the “post-
period”) minus the same difference from 1982-86 (i.e., the “pre-period”).  
This estimator suggests that the adoption of the 65 mph speed limit 
increased fatality rates by 0.185 and speeds by 2.8 mph on rural interstates.
14  
The same analysis applied to the data on urban interstate and rural 
arterial roads is contained in the bottom two panels of Table 1.  These 
roadtypes were not directly affected by the law change.  They thus provide a 
test of whether they might usefully serve as an additonal control group.  The 
entries in the table indicate that fatality rates decreased more in adopting 
states than non-adopting states on both categories of roads.
15  When these 
declines are viewed in the context of the 1982-86 levels, they appear modest.  
If these relative declines in adopting states are due to an unobserved factor 
                                                 
 
 common to all roads in these states, then these roads should be used as intra-
state comparisons.  It is evident that controlling for this decline will increase 
the magnitude of the estimated effect of the 65 mph limit on fatalities.   
Average speeds increased at about the same rate in adopting and non-
adopting states on these roadtypes.  Interestingly, the speed data contradict 
the popular “spillover” hypothesis that higher speed limits on one road cause 
drivers to increase their driving speed on all roads.   
Column (2) reports the results of the application of the DD estimator 
applied to the ln transformation of the raw, state by roadtype by year data.  
The ln difference approach is attractive because it provides estimates of 
(approximately) proportionate changes in speeds and fatality rates.  The 
estimates of the increased speed limit imply proportionate increases of 0.31 
in the fatality rate and of 0.045 in speed.  The estimated changes on urban 
interstates are quite small, at –0.063 and –0.009, while they are even smaller 
at 0.005 and 0.008 on rural arterials.  These results suggest that it is worth 
considering the results of using both urban interstate and rural arterial roads 
as additional control group for the analysis of rural interstate road. 
 
  c. Estimates of the VSL   Estimates of an upper bound on the VSL are contained in Tables 2 
and 3.  There two separate analyses because, in this case, the results depend 
on the precise specification of the way the trade-off between travel time 
saved and fatality risks is measured.  In Table 2 the analysis is done using 
logarithmic (proportionate) changes, while in the Table 3 the analysis is 
done in natural units.  In each table there are 10 different estimates of the 
VSL depending on which groups are used for the comparison, adopters vs. 
non-adopters on rural interstates being used as a part of the comparison 
throughout.  The other estimates differ to the extent that urban interstate and 
rural arterial roads are used as part of the control group for comparison.  
They also differ in the extent to which detailed controls are used to adjust for 
state, year, and roadtype changes that might confound estimates of the effect 
of the speed limit on speeds and fatalities. 
  For each specification in each table there are three numbers.  The first 
is the estimate of the trade-off between hours saved and fatality risk.
16  The 
second is the estimate of the standard error of the parameter estimated, while 
the third is transformed by the value of time to provide a measure of the 
VSL. 
                                                 
16 These are estimates of a regression of the hours it takes to travel a mile on fatalities, with the state-year 
interaction associated with the adoption of the 65 mile per hour speed limit used as an instrumental variable 
for fatalities.   It is apparent from the tables that the estimates of the VSL are fairly 
sensitive to the specification assumed for the analysis, though the range of 
estimates may provide a workable basis for broad conclusions.  Using the 
rural interstate roads as comparators only, the estimates of the VSL are $1.6 
million for the analysis in levels and $6.0 million for the analysis in 
logarithms.  In general, this difference is typical of those in the tables and 
these two numbers provide pretty representative estimates from each table, 
though smaller and larger VSL estimates can be found in them.  The primary 
advantage of these estimates is the extent to which they can withstand 
scrutiny based on the conceptual issues associated with measuring the VSL.  
Their biggest disadvantage is that they are not unambiguously independent 
of the specification used to produce them. 
 
4.  Prospects 
  It has been just thirty years during which economists have defined, 
quantified, and critiqued the operational definition of safety risks 
summarized as the Value of a Statistical Life.  Looking back, this is quite a 
remarkable accomplishment.  The basic theory is both widely understood 
and taught, but also used in public decisions in many areas.  Measurements 
of the VSL are essential for decisions based on these ideas, and apparently the precision of the estimates we have is considered better than the use of no 
measurements at all.  Of course, there is room for much improvement, and 
no doubt there will be a great deal of it. References 
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Table 1:  Difference in Differences (DD) Estimates of 65 Mph Speed Limit on Fatality 
Rates and Speeds 
  DD of Levels DD of Natural 
Logarithms
 (1)  (2) 
Rural Interstates (Affected Roadtype)  
Fatality Rate  0.185  0.311 
Speed 2.8 0.045 
Urban Interstates (Unaffected Roadtype)  
Fatality Rate  -0.052  -0.063 
Speed -0.5 
-0.009 
Rural Arterials (Unaffected Roadtype)  
Fatality Rate  -0.123  0.005 
Speed 0.5 0.008 
Notes: The entries in this table represent two difference in differences (DD) 
estimates of the effects of the 65 mph speed limit on fatality rates and speeds.  
The column (1) entries are the raw DD estimates.  The column (2) entries are 
calculated with the mean of ln (fatality rate) and ln (speed) for adopters and 
non-adopters in the pre and post periods.  The entries are equal to the post - 
pre difference of weighted means among adopters minus the post - pre 
difference of weighted means among non-adopters, where the weight is 
vehicle miles of travel.  The pre-period is defined as 1982-86 and the post-










Table 2: Estimates of the Monetary Value of the Time Saved per Marginal Fatality 
Sample  (1) (2) (3) 
Functional Form I: Ln Transformation   
Rural Interstates  --------- -0.113** --------- 
Only    (.037)   
    [$1.64 million]   
     
Rural Interstates &  -0.095*  -0.076*  -0.076** 
Urban  Interstates  (.040) (.034) (.031) 
  [$1.38 million]  [$1.11 million] [$1.11  million] 
     
Rural Interstates &  -0.166**  -0.146*  -0.122* 
Rural  Arterials  (.057) (.066) (.051) 
  [$2.42 million]  [$2.12 million] [$1.78  million] 
     
All  Three  -0.128** -0.103** -0.099** 
  (.042) (.041) (.034) 
  [$1.86 million]  [$1.50 million] [$1.44  million] 
Year Indicators  Yes  No  No 
Year-Roadtype Indicators  No  Yes  Yes 
State-Roadtype  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year Indicators  No  No  Yes 
Notes.  For details see Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004). The entries 
report the results from regressions of ln (Hours of Travel) on ln (Fatalities), 
where an indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force is an 
instrumental variable.  The details of the controls on roadtype and year and 
state effects are in the stub of the table.  Ln (VMT) is a control and its effect 
is allowed to vary by roadtype.  The entries are the parameter estimates and 
heteroskedastic consistent standard errors (in parentheses) on ln (Fatalities) 
and the implied monetary value of the time saved per marginal fatality, V, 
[in square brackets].    * indicates significance at 5% level, ** indicates 






Table 3: Estimates of the Monetary Value of the Time Saved per Marginal Fatality 
Sample  (1) (2) (3) 
Functional Form II: Untransformed   
Rural Interstates  --------- 17.03* --------- 
Only    (7.67)   
    [$5.92 million]   
     
Rural Interstates &  25.64**  16.39*  8.65* 
Urban  Interstates  (9.42) (7.46) (3.84) 
  [$8.91 million]  [$5.69 million] [$3.00  million] 
     
Rural Interstates &  4.01**  8.25  7.88* 
Rural  Arterials  (0.51) (4.32) (3.79) 
  [$1.39 million]  [$2.87 million] [$2.74  million] 
     
All  Three  6.97** 11.98* 8.80** 
  (1.16) (5.06) (3.57) 
  [$2.42 million]  [$4.16 million] [$3.06  million] 
Year Indicators  Yes  No  No 
Year-Roadtype Indicators  No  Yes  Yes 
State-Roadtype  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year Indicators  No  No  Yes 
Notes:  The entries report the results from regressions of speed on fatality 
rates, where an indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force is 
an instrumental variable. The equation is weighted by the square root of 
VMT.  The details of the controls on roadtype and year and state effects are 
in the stub of the table.  The entries are the parameter estimates and 
heteroskedastic consistent standard errors (in parentheses) on the fatality 
rate and the implied monetary value of the time saved per marginal fatality, 
V, [in square brackets].  * indicates significance at 5% level, ** indicates 
significance at 1% level 